Vulnerability advisory
GHSA-x9p5-w45c-7ffc
Gogs: Access tokens get exposed through URL params in API requests
Also known as CVE-2026-26196GO-2026-4619
Severity
- CVSS 3.x
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N - CVSS 4.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected versions
| Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|
All versions through 0.13.3 | No fix listed |
Description
Summary
The Gogs API still accepts tokens in URL parameters such as token and access_token, which can leak through logs, browser history, and referrers.
Details
A static review shows that the API still checks tokens in the URL query before looking at headers:
- internal/context/auth.go reads
c.Query("token") - internal/context/auth.go falls back to
c.Query("access_token") - internal/context/auth.go only checks the
Authorizationheader when the query token is empty - internal/context/auth.go authenticates using that token and marks the request as token-authenticated
Token-authenticated requests are accepted by API routes through c.IsTokenAuth checks:
- internal/route/api/v1/api.go
Impact
If tokens are sent in URLs such as /api/v1/user?token=..., they can leak in logs, browser or shell history, and referrer headers, and can be reused until revoked.
Recommended Fix
- Authentication headers should be used exclusively for token transmission.
- Token parameters should be blocked at the proxy or WAF level.
- Query strings should be scrubbed from logs.
- A strict referrer policy should be set.
Remediation
A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.